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Abstract:  
 
In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups, observers declared the resurrection of the 
bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats, though, remained influential even during the period of 1992-
2006, when elected politicians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic 
involvement in politics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories of politician-
bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal-agent frameworks. I apply 
agency theory to Thailand, testing three different hypotheses derived from the theory. 
Examining legislative productivity and control over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find 
that elected politicians increasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 
2006, and to a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequently 
engaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expanding their independence 
vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal-agent model overlooks the range of 
resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear in developing countries, granting them greater 
autonomy than anticipated. As such, theories of the politician-bureaucrat relationship in 
developing states need to better account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats 
exercise autonomy and political influence.   
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For decades Thailand’s bureaucracy dominated politics, a condition Riggs (1966) labelled 
“bureaucratic polity,” wherein the main competitions for resources, authority, and influence 
occurred within and between bureaucratic cliques. Power slowly transitioned out of 
bureaucratic hands during the 1980s and 1990s as business interests, the middle class, and 
regional bosses joined the political sphere (Anek 1992; Ockey 1992), and following the 1992 
crisis, the Thai state was believed to be firmly in the hands of civilian politicians (Bidhya 
2005; Chai-Anan 1997). Two decades later, in the wake of two coups and a military junta, 
observers have declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity (Porphant 2014; 
Puangthong 2014; Supalak 2014; Surin 2007). 
 The narrative of the bureaucracy’s dominance, fall, and resurgence, though, presents 
an interesting challenge for political science theory. Standard political economy discussions 
of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats rely heavily on principal-agent 
frameworks (Meier and Krause 2003; Moe 1984; Wood and Waterman 1991). The approach 
espouses a fundamental assumption of a hierarchical relationship between political principals 
and bureaucratic agents, and scholars in this vein seek to understand the mechanisms 
incentivizing, monitoring, and overseeing bureaucrats to ensure that they pursue the desires 
of their political principals (Moe 1987; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Shapiro 2005; 
Weingast 1984). Bureaucrats are treated as active during policy implementation but largely 
passive in the political process (Huber and Shipan 2002; Moe 2006).  
 Melding these predominant theories of politician-bureaucrat relationships with the 
experience of Thailand appears somewhat problematic, as specialists frequently describe Thai 
bureaucrats as actively engaged in politics and independent of politician control (Chambers 
and Napisa 2016; Merieau 2016; Unger 2003). Such claims contradict the basic assumptions 
of agency theory, leaving us with the question: Who are the principals of the Thai state, 
politicians or bureaucrats? In this essay, I make two claims by examining methods of political 
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control over the bureaucracy. First, I demonstrate that the assumptions underpinning the 
principal-agent model do have some applicability in describing the relationship between Thai 
civilian politicians and bureaucrats, especially during the period from 1992 through 2006; at 
the same time, though, the utility of agency theory is limited. Second, I demonstrate that the 
politician-bureaucrat relationship in Thailand is complicated by political power struggles 
between bureaucratic agencies and elected politicians. Many officials within Thailand’s 
bureaucracy actively hinder civilian control over the arms of the state. While positive signals 
emerged from 1992 through 2006, much of that progress has disappeared.  
 At the theoretical level, the Thai case suggests that we must seriously re-examine 
theories of bureaucratic politics, especially in the context of developing states. While the 
literature on politician-bureaucracy relations acknowledges the importance of the 
bureaucracy, its basic assumption of a hierarchical relationship overlooks the power of 
bureaucrats (Baekgaard, Blom-Hansen, and Serritzlew 2015; Fukuyama 2013). Such 
assumptions are dubious; in many countries bureaucracies are intimately involved in politics, 
and they, as organizations and individuals, are not passive recipients of the choices made by 
politicians (Moe 2006; Carpenter 2001). Indeed, in Thailand we see that the politician-
bureaucracy relationship is not always hierarchical but rather transaction-based. This 
confuses the distinction between agents and principals (Unger 2003; Unger and Chandra 
2016, 80-92). We need better theoretical constructs to deal with such cases.  
 The remainder of this essay is as follows. I begin by briefly reviewing agency theory, 
drawing a set of predictions for the Thai state. I then test these hypotheses, first through 
examining the legislative productivity of parliament. Next, I turn to politician control over 
career trajectories of bureaucrats in two of Thailand’s most important ministries, the Ministry 
of Interior and the Ministry of Defence. Finally, I close the essay with a discussion of the 
implications of these findings.  
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Agency Theory and Bureaucratic Control 
 
The principal-agent framework, also known as agency theory, is the most prominent 
theoretical base for social science work on politician-bureaucrat relationships (Moe 1984; 
Meier and Krause 2003; Shapiro 2005; Weingast 1984). Borrowed from economics, agency 
theory focuses on contractual relationships wherein a principal hires an agent to accomplish a 
task; the challenge is then to use incentives and monitoring to align the actions of the agent 
with the desires of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Political scientists who adopted 
this perspective operate under the assumption that political authority is ultimately the domain 
of politicians, but their actions are circumscribed by institutions and contexts (Huber and 
Shipan 2002). Monitoring costs, bureaucratic expertise, and veto players in the political 
process largely determine the amount of slack that bureaucratic agents enjoy. The 
bureaucracy exercises influence over policy primarily through implementation because of 
opportunities for shirking or sabotage (Brehm and Gates 1999). Bureaucrats, though, may 
ultimately recognize their relatively weak position and align their interests with politicians, 
thus creating a mirage of bureaucratic independence (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). At 
risk of oversimplification, politicians are the ultimate policy-makers; bureaucratic discretion 
exists primarily under conditions which hinder politicians’ ability to monitor and enforce 
their preferred policy. 
 This theoretical work contrasts with a second body of scholarship on non-Western 
countries that has highlighted the political strength of autonomous bureaucracies in 
determining policy outcomes, a condition that may be very beneficial in the pursuit of growth 
strategies (Evans 1995; Johnson 1982). Despite potential benefits, autonomy can also create 
dilemmas. When policy reforms come to the fore, bureaucrats are among the largest groups 
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of “losers” who face the costs of downsizing, retraining, or restructuring (Grindle 2004). 
Thus, bureaucracies have strong vested interests in shaping government action, and they may 
leverage their political influence to shape or block policy outcomes that threaten their 
interests. This literature sees bureaucrats and politicians in a potential power struggle; only 
when politicians are strong are they able to exercise subjective control over their counterparts 
in the bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2013; Huntington 1957). Otherwise bureaucrats, with their 
norms, expertise, and goals, can control the policy arena.  
Advocates of agency theory contest these claims, arguing that such observations are 
due to either agency slack or the alignment of bureaucrat and politician interests; principal-
agent frameworks still apply (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Politicians remain in 
command due to their ability to exert influence over bureaucrats through various 
mechanisms, including writing legislation (Huber and Shipan 2002; McCubbins et al. 1987), 
control over bureaucratic appointments and careers (Peters 1997; Wood and Waterman 
1991), budgetary decisions (Dunleavy 1991), bureaucratic reorganizations (Schwartz 1994), 
and monitoring institutions such as courts or an ombudsman’s office (Bennett 1997).   
Scholarship on Thailand’s politician-bureaucrat relationships tends to align with the 
second body of literature, treating bureaucrats as relatively autonomous and politically active 
(Bidhya and Ora-orn 2010; Ockey 2004; Unger 2003; Unger and Chandra 2016), and as such, 
it has largely side-stepped any challenge agency theory might pose to this interpretation of 
events. Can agency theory, then, apply to Thailand? To gauge this, I focus on two methods of 
political control over the bureaucracy: law-making and bureaucratic appointments.1 First, 
legislators exert their policy authority by writing more laws and including greater detail in the 
laws they produce; specific and lengthy statutes tend to delineate the exact actions that 
bureaucracies are to take in their implementation of laws. Short and vague legislation, on the 
other hand, grants leeway to bureaucrats (Huber and Shipan 2002, 3-8). Second, politicians 
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may also control bureaucrats through either rewarding those who please them or punishing 
those who do not via promotions and advancement, especially among high-ranking officials 
(Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Wood and Waterman 1991). According to agency theory, 
control of the legislative and appointment processes grants politicians dominance over 
bureaucrats.   
Drawing from this literature, we can identify three observable predictions regarding 
the politician-bureaucrat relationship in Thailand that should be in evidence if politicians act 
as principals of the Thai state. Two of the predictions have to do with legislative productivity 
while the third focuses on politician control over bureaucratic career advancement. First, if 
politicians in Thailand are acting as principals of the state, we should see variation in the 
level of bureaucratic discretion written into legislation as the number of veto players in the 
legislature changes. The logic behind this claim is based on the increasing difficulty of 
passing legislation as coalition size grows. Each additional coalition partner brings a new 
policy preference to the table, constraining the acceptable range of policies (Tsebelis 2002). 
Due to the increasing probability of conflict in the coalition, politicians will reduce the 
amount of legislation and the detail of that legislation in order to reach a mutually agreeable 
compromise with coalition partners; this, in turn, grants greater discretion to the bureaucracy. 
The opposite should also hold. Bureaucratic discretion should decline as politicians are able 
to act collectively.  
 Second, we know that policy-making is costly both in terms of information and 
transactions. Politicians must pay these costs in their efforts to reign in bureaucratic slack. 
Certain politicians will have greater capacity to do so due to their education and talents. 
Huber and Shipan (2002) refer to this as legislative capacity. The most important skills in this 
realm are those related to understanding and writing legislation. Thus, we expect that if 
politicians are truly masters over the bureaucracy, we should see shifts in legislative output 
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according to their individual talents. A more-skilled or better-trained politician should 
exercise greater control over the bureaucracy through legislation. 
In other words, variation in legislative productivity resulting from coalition size or 
legislative capacity signals that politicians act as principals, directing the state via law-
making, but their actions are constrained according to predictable patterns. A lack of 
variation along these hypotheses would indicate that some other mechanisms are at play that 
are not currently described within agency theory.   
Third, beyond a focus on legislation, questions of power dynamics between 
politicians and bureaucrats play themselves out in the promotion and tenure paths of 
government officials (Peters 1997). If a bureaucrat acts contrary to politician preferences, 
presumably politicians have the authority to either dismiss the official or hinder his or her 
career advancement. Thus, policy that is developed and implemented by the bureaucracy 
would remain in line with politician preferences (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Otherwise 
state officials would incur the wrath of politicians. The observable implication of this 
prediction is that politicians in control of the bureaucracy should regularly influence the 
tenure and promotion of bureaucrats (Wood and Waterman 1991). If bureaucratic 
appointments are made contrary to politician preferences, then politicians are not in 
command.  
 In the case that these three predictions follow the expectations of agency theory, we 
can more confidently argue that Thai politicians act as principals of the Thai state. On the 
other hand, if there is no clear preponderance of evidence in favour of such a politician-
bureaucrat relationship, we will be forced to reconsider the applicability of agency theory’s 
assumptions.  
 
Controlling Legislation  
8 
 
 
I evaluate the first two implications of agency theory by examining variation in legislative 
productivity across individual governments in Thailand. I consider governments formed 
during elected legislatures from 1992 through 2013, as it was only after 1992 that scholars 
widely recognized politicians as dominant over bureaucrats (Bidhya 2005). This period, 
especially from 1992 to 2006, provides us the most-likely scenario under which politicians 
would act as principals. In other words, if our predictions fail to describe the activities of 
these governments, then it is highly unlikely that the assumptions of agency theory hold in 
the Thai case. This leaves me with ten governments formed from elected legislatures.2 
Despite constitutional changes, the legislative process remained constant, removing this as a 
potential confounding factor (Chanchai and Apirach 2011).  
 For the first two tests of agency theory detailed above, the outcome of interest is the 
degree of bureaucratic discretion gauged by legislative productivity. To measure this, I first 
look at the number of laws signed by each government per month. This signals how active 
each government was in promoting new policies. Without new laws, the bulk of policy-
making is left to bureaucratic discretion. Two additional measures deal with the detail of 
legislation rather than the amount. Politicians exercise control over policy implementation by 
writing more detail into laws; the longer the law, the less discretion available to the 
bureaucracy.  
 These counts are based on the Yearly Summary of the Laws produced by the 
Secretariat of the House of Representatives. Calculations include both Royal Acts 
(Phraracha Banyat) and Emergency Decrees (Phraracaha Kamnod).3 On average, between 
September 23, 1992 and December 31, 2013, elected legislatures in Thailand produced 2.74 
laws per month.4 The mean length of Thai laws in the same period is 7.64 pages with 23.47 
articles, with median lengths of 3 pages and 8 articles. Table 1 presents legislative 
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productivity numbers across the ten governments in my analysis. Appendix Table 1 combines 
Christensen and Ammar’s (1993) counts with my own to provide data for the 60-year period 
from 1953 through 2013.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Coalition Size 
 
The first observable implication that Thai politicians and bureaucrats are in a principal-agent 
style relationship would be that legislative productivity should shift according to coalition 
size. In other words, the number of laws produced by a government as well as the detail in 
those laws should vary inversely with the number of veto players present; with fewer 
coalition partners, legislation should be more frequent and detailed (Tsebelis 2002). I use the 
effective number of coalition parties to gauge the number of vetoes present in the cabinet (see 
Blau 2008).5  
 Thai cabinets have exhibited a tendency toward broad coalitions, with a few important 
exceptions, most prominently the governments under Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister, 
Yingluck. If agency theory were truly describing the politician-bureaucrat relationship in 
Thailand, we should expect that these governments exhibit greater legislative productivity 
than their counterparts.6 Yet this is not the case. There appears to be no significant increase in 
the number of laws produced by the legislature during periods in which a single party is 
dominant. Thaksin’s first term hovered just above the average, despite his extremely 
convincing electoral mandate and ability to reign in troublesome coalition partners.  Both 
Thaksin’s second term and Yingluck’s term were significantly below the average legislative 
activity.  
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One might explain these away by arguing that legislative activity was hindered by 
crisis situations during the both governments. In Thaksin’s case, protests in the months 
leading up to the coup may have hampered his ability to pass legislation. If we constrain the 
analysis to only the months before the crisis, though, results are not substantially different.  
Accounting for a slight delay in the time legislation takes from parliamentary approval to 
receiving the official acceptance, from the March 2005 through February 2006, Thaksin’s 
second government only produced 24 laws, or two laws per month. This was still below 
average and during a period in which Thaksin’s government enjoyed unprecedented 
dominance in the legislature. 
Yingluck fared only slightly better. If we were to remove the months she and 
Bangkok were inundated by a flooding crisis (August-December 2011) as well as anything 
after the major protests began against her government in November 2013, we are left with the 
months from January 2012 through December 2013, again considering the slight delay 
between passage in the parliament to acceptance of the law. During this time, the government 
passed 53 pieces of legislation at a rate of 2.21 laws per month. Even accounting for crisis, 
both Thaksin and Yingluk performed worse than average on the amount of legislation passed. 
In contrast, Thaksin’s first government did exhibit a dramatic increase in the number 
of pages per law as well as the number of articles per law. These counts were the highest 
among all the governments under consideration, showing that, despite the lack of expansion 
in new laws, there was an improvement in the level of detail and thus constraints on the 
bureaucracy. If we look more closely at his government, we also see that legislative 
productivity jumped dramatically from 2.64 laws per month to 4 laws per month after 
Thaksin dropped the Chart Pattana Party from his coalition in November 2003, dropping the 
effective number of parties from 1.5 to 1.28. This is consistent with the theoretical 
expectations. 
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Alternatively, governments with large numbers of coalition partners do tend to 
produce fewer pieces of legislation and less detailed legislation. Banharn’s government, with 
the highest number of coalition partners was also among the least productive of the 
legislatures under consideration. Similarly, Chuan’s first government was also unproductive. 
We do have two anomalies, which can be explained by considering the context in 
which they occurred. The second Chuan Leekpai government, with an initial count of 2.89 
effective and 6 actual parties in the coalition, exhibited relatively high legislative 
productivity. This would be contrary to our theoretical expectations. Even so, the Chuan 
government’s productivity came in the aftermath of the 1997 Financial Crisis, which created 
a special situation. Politicians that would regularly fight over resources began to cooperate 
due to the severe external shock they had recently faced. This decreased the number of 
effective veto players in the system. Thus, the number of parties with seats in the second 
Chuan cabinet belies the fact that vetoes had actually declined during this time, which would 
be in line with the hypothesis.  Furthermore, if we look more closely at the Chuan 
government’s legislative productivity, we can see that it increased substantially from 4 laws 
per month to 5.93 laws per month after the Social Action Party withdrew from the governing 
coalition in July 1999, dropping the effective number of parties to 2.66. This shift in 
productivity aligns with theoretical predictions.    
Another anomaly is the relative detail found in the legislation produced by the Abhisit 
Vejjajjiva government, which had 2.33 effective and 7 actual coalition parties. Again, context 
can explain this increase in legislative detail. Abhisit’s cabinet enjoyed behind-the-scenes 
support from the military faction that had conducted a coup in 2006. Military interference had 
assisted in the coalition formation and acted as a relatively invisible force reducing alternate 
parties’ veto threats (Chambers 2010). With reduced veto threats, our hypothesis would 
predict this outcome regarding detailed legislation. 
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 This pattern is further confirmed through statistical analysis of Thai laws from 1992 
through 2013. I assembled a dataset of legislative productivity of each month during the time 
period, including data on the effective number of coalition parties, which varied within-
government due to frequent cabinet reshuffles.  
The dataset includes two control variables for crises which have affected Thai 
legislative productivity. The first is a dummy variable highlighting the Tom Yang Kung 
Crisis, starting in May 1997 when speculative attacks began on the Thai Baht and continuing 
until December 1999, when economic reports showed that the Thai economy was again 
experiencing positive growth. All other times scored a zero. The economic crisis presumably 
reduced the number of veto players and allowed for increased legislative productivity. The 
second crisis variable accounts for mass protests, scored as a 1 during the presence of 
demonstrations, such as the protests against the Thaksin government (February-September 
2006), yellow-shirt activities against the Samak and Somchai governments (May-November 
2008), or the red-shirt protests during Abhisit’s administration (March-May 2010). The 
turmoil should have reduced legislative productivity. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 2.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Regression analysis indicates that monthly legislative productivity was negatively 
correlated with the effective number of coalition parties. These numbers were statistically 
significant in the amount of detail in legislation measured by law length. As the post-2006 
governments have been subject to military influence, I repeated the analysis including only 
the months from September 1992 to October 2006. The correlation held in both cases, 
displaying that there is an observable relationship between an increase in coalition size and a 
decrease in the amount of detail that is included in Thai laws. These findings suggest that 
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Thai politicians did experience veto player constraints on their ability to produce legislation, 
consistent with the predictions of agency theory.  
In sum, there is some support for the hypothesis that broader coalitions result in less 
law-making. Qualitatively, it does appear that in situations of fewer veto players, politicians 
were legislatively more productive, especially during the second Chuan and Abhisit periods 
wherein outside forces reduced the number of veto players in the system. Quantitatively, we 
also see that the amount of detail written into legislation is negatively correlated with the 
effective number of coalition parties in government; this holds for both the full dataset as 
well as the constrained (1992-2006) dataset. Thai politicians, then, had the potential to 
control bureaucrats via legislation, but their actions varied in line with the predictions of 
agency theory. Even so, this cannot explain why both the second Thaksin and Yingluck 
governments failed to produce much legislation despite their political clout. 
 
Legislative Capacity 
 
The second implication from agency theory is that as the legislative capacity of politicians 
increases, so should their ability to reign in the bureaucracy through legislation. Huber and 
Shipan (2002) gauged capacity through measuring compensation across legislators in the 
USA; this approach would not work in Thailand, though. Instead, we can proxy legislative 
capacity of the executive through measuring educational attainment of the prime minister. 
First, education is vitally important in the composition and understanding of legislation. 
Certain types of education lend themselves to greater ability to convey policy preference into 
written laws. Also, higher levels of education would decrease the information costs a 
politician must pay in order to understand legislation, its production, and implementation. 
Second, the capacity of the prime minister is key to the development of laws, as the prime 
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minister sets the legislative agenda and potentially has strong influence over the legislation 
emerging from parliament (Chanchai and Apirach 2011).  
Again, we should expect that prime ministers who presided over periods of 
particularly detailed legislation should have either higher educational attainments or 
educations more pertinent to writing laws than their counterparts. Here we have three prime 
ministers to consider: Chuan Leekpai, Thaksin Shinawatra, and Abhisit Vejjajjiva. In 1962 
Chuan obtained a law degree at the prestigious Thammasat University. He was admitted to 
the bar association two years later and practiced law before joining politics. Thaksin 
graduated from the Royal Thai Police Cadet Academy in 1973 and then pursued graduate 
degrees in criminal justice in the United States. He holds an MA from Eastern Kentucky 
University and a PhD from Sam Houston State University. Abhisit holds both an 
undergraduate degree (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) and a master’s degree in 
economics from Oxford University. All three would be considered highly educated in areas 
that have some relevance to law making. As such, I evaluate their legislative capacity as high.  
Of course, Chuan and Thaksin also presided over less productive periods. The reasons 
for Thaksin’s less productive second term and Chuan’s opportunity to engage in legislative 
production during his second term have already been discussed above. It is worth noting, 
though, that when given the opportunity to engage in law-making, they presided over some of 
the most detailed legislation in Thai history. Abhisit’s tenure is also instructive. Despite 
passing relatively few laws, his government did make those laws more detailed. The level of 
specificity could have been due to his greater legislative capacity. 
 Do their counterparts exhibit less legislative capacity? Banharn Silpa-Archa left 
secondary school during World War Two and pursued a business career. He only returned to 
education after becoming an influential politician, completing both a bachelor’s and master’s 
degree in law at Ramkhamhaeng University, where he was accused of plagiarizing his thesis.7 
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Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a retired general, completed a degree at the Royal Military 
Academy. Samak Sundaravej completed a bachelor of law degree at Thammasat, although he 
did not practice. Somchai Wongsawat also completed a bachelor of law degree from 
Thammasat in 1970. He was admitted to the bar association in 1973. Nearly thirty years later 
he completed a MPA degree at the National Institute of Development Administration. 
Yingluck Shinawatra graduated in 1988 with a degree in politics from Chiang Mai University 
before pursuing an MPA at Kentucky State University.   
 These degrees provide some indication as to the legislative capacity of these prime 
ministers. Banharn exhibits lower educational attainments than his counterparts, only 
obtaining a degree long after he was an active politician. We can judge his legislative 
capacity as likely lower than the three high-performing executives. Chavalit’s degree in 
military studies was unlikely to have granted him expertise in law-making, which also bodes 
poorly for his legislative capacity. As such, I evaluate both Banharn and Chavalit as having 
low legislative capacity. Samak appears to never have joined the bar association, a potential 
indicator that his performance in law school was not on par with that attained by Chuan. On 
the surface, Yingluck’s degrees appear relevant to writing legislation, but her graduate 
specialization was in management information systems. Her work after graduation was also 
business oriented rather than linked to legislative capacity. I rank both Samak and Yingluck 
as having moderate legislative capacity. Only Somchai’s background seems to approach 
those of the three high-performing legislators. Even so, he was in office for only two and a 
half tumultuous months and presided over the passing of only two laws, one of which was the 
annual budget. Had he been in office longer, he may have had the opportunity to preside over 
more detailed legislation.  
 It appears, then, that there is some support for the claim that politicians with greater 
legislative capacity will engage in writing more detailed legislation and thus reduce the 
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discretionary authority of the bureaucracy. This is supported by statistical analysis (Table 2), 
which showed that the legislative capacity of the prime minister, measured as a three-point 
ordinal variable, was positively correlated with both the number of laws produced by a 
government per month as well as the number of pages in those laws. Even so, this 
relationship is somewhat weaker than that seen between coalition composition and legislative 
productivity.  
 To summarize, these findings should prove heartening for advocates of agency theory, 
as the observed variation implies that Thai politicians have the capacity to exercise authority 
over their bureaucratic agents via legislation. Also, there does seem to be some support that 
legislative capacity does shape the ability of executives to produce more detailed legislation 
and reign in the bureaucracy. While high numbers of veto players in cabinets might explain 
low levels of legislative productivity, we don’t see the expected result with the second 
Thaksin and Yingluck governments when a single party dominated.8  
 
Controlling Bureaucratic Career Paths 
 
Now I turn to the third test of agency theory’s implications for bureaucratic tenure and 
promotion decisions. If the assumptions of agency theory are correct, we should see that 
politicians are able to readily influence bureaucratic career paths.  
 Thai civil service reshuffles can be very disputatious, especially among resource-rich 
ministries such as Interior, Transportation, and Commerce (Bidhya 2010). Control of these 
portfolios determines the distribution of resources throughout the country. Political parties 
first seek to command the cabinet seat of the portfolio, which is done through coalition 
bargaining during government formation. Once in office, they may also promote their 
supporters within the bureaucracy to higher positions.  
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 The causal chain is complicated as bureaucrats pursue alliances with political figures. 
Officials also strive to reduce political interference within their agencies, as this may upset 
their own path to promotion or diminish their ability to provide adequate services. By and 
large, promotion within the Thai civil service is based on tenure and personal networks rather 
than capacity or skill (Akira 2014, 321-324).  
 Because of these complexities, it is difficult to identify exactly who controls the 
appointment process. Even so, we can observe the effect of political influence by considering 
the role of politicians in the appointment and promotion of officials. Here I choose to focus 
on two of the most important and powerful ministries in the Thai bureaucracy: The Ministry 
of Interior and the Ministry of Defence (Bidhya 2001). These two ministries present the most 
stringent test of political control over the bureaucracy as they have a history of autonomy 
from civilian politicians. Indeed, if predictions drawn from agency theory fit the experience 
of the fiercely independent Defence and Interior ministries, we would have a strong case for 
the application of principal-agent frames in the Thai context. 
 First, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is important both in terms of budget and political 
influence. Monetarily, MOI receives one of the largest allowances of any ministry, 
accounting for over eleven percent of the total budget in 2011, second only to the Ministry of 
Education. Unlike Education, where most money is committed to staff salaries, most of the 
MOI budget (approximately 78 percent in 2011) is available for lucrative investments and 
subsidies. Politically, MOI has a strong and extensive network of civil servants throughout 
the country. Officials in this ministry include provincial governors, the police force, and local 
administrators. MOI bureaucrats are at least tangentially involved in almost all aspects of 
domestic governance (Achakorn and Tatchalerm, 2014). Indeed, MOI had a long history as a 
“super ministry” with broad-reaching authority and independence (Bidhya and Ora-orn 2010: 
311; Achakorn and Chandra 2011: 56-63).  
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 Second, the Ministry of Defence, including the military, has been the most influential 
branch of the bureaucracy throughout Thailand’s history. From the date of the coup that 
overthrew the absolute monarchy on June 28, 1932 until June 28, 2017, the office of prime 
minister has been filled by either an active or retired military official for 21,010 days or 
approximately 68 percent of the time. Bidhya Bowornwathana, one of the most prominent 
experts on Thai bureaucracy, argued that it would have been best to categorize Thailand’s 
“bureaucratic polity” as a “military polity” (interview with author, Bangkok, 13 February, 
2012). Civilian control over the military is one of the major challenges facing the Thai state 
(Chambers, 2010; Punchada and Ricks 2016).  
 If the assumptions of agency theory hold, then we should see that politicians exert 
regular influence over promotions. If the contrary is true, the promotion and tenure of 
bureaucrats should be handled internal to the agency, despite political preferences to the 
contrary.  
 
Ministry of Interior 
 
In the MOI, the position of provincial governor is among the most coveted, reserved for those 
who reach C-10 status, the second highest rank in the Thai civil service. Provincial governors 
not only hold the highest seat in the ministry at the provincial level, they also supervise the 
efforts of other ministries and departments within their administrative boundaries. MOI 
officials at this level have been able to dominate the distribution of public finances to lower 
levels (Achakorn and Tatchalerm, 2014). The power of the position makes the annual 
reshuffle of governors among the most important regular events in the MOI, and the reshuffle 
regularly features in national politics.  
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 Historically, management of governors has been dominated by career bureaucrats. 
Early in the 1990s, a reform proposal emerged to democratize the provinces, changing 
governors from MOI appointments to elected offices. The first Chuan government was forced 
to abandon this idea under fierce resistance from the MOI, indicating the ministry’s strength 
in the policy arena (Nagai, Ozaki, and Kimata, 2007: 5-7). Beyond this, during the Chuan and 
Banharn governments, appointments of provincial governors generally followed the desires 
of ministry officials. Indeed, politicians complained that the October 1995 reshuffle list was 
compiled by civil servants without allowing politicians to provide input (Bangkok Post, 
1995b). The ministry’s permanent secretary confirmed that the prime minister “made no 
change to the [reshuffle] list” the agency had provided to the government (Bangkok Post, 
1995a).  
 Late in the 1990s, though, civilian politicians gained greater control over the ministry. 
Chavalit moved some governors know to be close to Banharn into inactive posts (Temsak 
1997). When Chuan took office after the Asian Financial Crisis, he was soon criticized for 
orchestrating a major shakeup of the MOI outside of the annual schedule; fifteen governors 
were transferred in April rather than waiting for the usual October reshuffle. Chuan and MOI 
officials, though, denied that the reshuffles were politically motivated (Bangkok Post, 1998a; 
Bangkok Post 1998b). No matter the cause, the reshuffle signalled that Chuan’s government 
was able to implement changes outside of the regular promotion schedule.  
 When Thaksin came to power in 2001, he set his sights on reforming the bureaucracy, 
including governorships, adopting what would become known as the “CEO” governor policy. 
The reform was meant to improve lines of accountability by making governors responsible 
for all local governments in their province. They would then report directly to the Prime 
Minsters’ office (Mutebi, 2004; Painter, 2006). This centralization of power gave Thaksin 
added incentive to become more involved in the annual MOI reshuffle. Reshuffle lists now 
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passed directly through the Prime Minister’s office for review and approval (Yuwadee and 
Temsak, 2003).  Thaksin used control over gubernatorial reshuffles to reward supporters and 
punish defectors, a fact recognized in US diplomatic cables (US Embassy, 2005).  One retired 
deputy governor explained, “Prior to Thaksin there may have been a little bit [of political 
influence in annual reshuffles], but it wasn’t overt; it became very obvious during Thaksin’s 
time” (interview with author, Khon Kaen, 28 October, 2015).  
 After elections returned in 2008, ensuing governments continued to exert control over 
gubernatorial appointments. Political sparks flew between Abhisit’s Democrat Party and its 
coalition partner, Bhumjai Thai, over control of the annual reshuffle (Bangkok Post 2009; 
Veera 2010). Through directing the placement of governors and the forced retirement of 
Thaksin appointees, the new coalition government sought to assert itself in MOI (Pradit, 
Aekarach, and Surasak 2009). This approach was repeated by the Yingluck administration 
(Pradit, 2012; Bangkok Post, 2012).  
 The experience of the MOI provides evidence for the claim that politicians have come 
to serve as a hierarchical authority over bureaucracies. While during the 1990s, the 
bureaucracy could resist politician preferences, this autonomy ended after the 1997 
constitution. Thaksin’s concentrated political power allowed him to gain control over the 
reshuffle and politicize it further. A former member of the Civil Service Commission argued 
that bureaucrats, “can’t [resist] if there is a strong government. The 1997 Constitution gave 
this power to the government” (interview with author, Bangkok, 15 September, 2014). The 
civil servants in the MOI became much more proactive in aligning their actions with the 
desires of politicians, including pre-emptively vetting the annual reshuffle list with the prime 
minister and members of the cabinet (Retired deputy governor, interview with author, Khon 
Kaen, 28 October, 2015). Post-Thaksin civilian leaders have continued to intervene in the 
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gubernatorial reshuffle list, indicating that politicians were acting as principals, exercising 
much greater control over MOI.  
 
Ministry of Defence  
 
Civilian politicians in Thailand have maintained an uneasy rapport with military leaders. 
Prime Ministers seek to maintain good relations with military officers, often by filling the 
post of Minister of Defence with a retired military officer loyal to their cause. When Chuan 
Leekpai appointed himself as Defence Minister in 1997, it was the first time a civilian had 
done so since 1976. Since Chuan, though, Samak, Somchai, and Yingluck all filled the 
portfolio in hopes of cultivating closer ties with the military (Patsara and Wassana 2013). 
Taking these positions, though, did not signal that politicians were in control of the annual 
military reshuffles. Instead they sought to develop close ties with the armed forces to forestall 
possible coup attempts.  
 From 1992 through 2001, we see evidence that political control of the military was 
growing through efforts made by civilian politicians to influence military appointments.9 
Chuan’s first government took several actions contrary to the interests of the military, 
including limiting budget growth and arms purchases. Beyond this, Banharn’s cabinet 
blocked some military appointments desired by top brass (Tasker 1995; Wassana 1995). The 
military’s diminished political role played out in the senate as well where, in 1996, only 18.4 
percent of senators were drawn from the ranks of retired soldiers, a sharp drop from the 55.2 
percent previously (Chambers, 2013a).  
 In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Chuan chose Surayud Chulanont as the 
new military chief; Surayud claimed to be firmly committed to keeping the military out of 
politics (Pasuk and Baker, 2009; Wassana, 2001). Reform efforts, though, were slow. Chuan 
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admitted that earlier attempts to rehabilitate the system of military promotions had failed as 
the ranks of generals continued to increase (Chuan, 1999). Ockey (2001: 208) wrote that 
civilians were still “unable to change the basic structure of the military.” Thus, political 
control over promotions and tenure from 1992 through 2001 was growing, but it was also 
limited.  
 As the new constitution took effect and the popular Thaksin Shinawatra government 
formed, it seemed that politicians were prepared and powerful enough to influence military 
reshuffles. The senate also became an elected body, with retired military officials almost 
completely disappearing from its ranks.  
 Thaksin saw the military as a possible threat to his political dominance, and he moved 
to bring it under his personal control, if not under the institutional control of politicians 
(McCargo and Ukrist, 2005). By appointing former Prime Minister Chavalit to his cabinet, he 
hoped to take advantage of the general-turned-politician’s skills and influence in directing 
military reshuffles (Chambers, 2013a). While Thaksin did re-politicize the military (Pasuk 
and Baker, 2009), he also brought the annual military reshuffles more directly under 
politician control. As a graduate of the Armed Forces Preparatory School and a former police 
officer, Thaksin had many contacts in the military, and he began promoting officers friendly 
to him. From 2001-2004, the prime minister’s office determined many important 
appointments in the annual military reshuffles, with some notable exceptions wherein current 
and retired military officers intervened to promote anti-Thaksin officers (Chambers 2013a, 
258-260). While this may not have signalled objective control of the military, at least the 
soldiers were largely under subjective control (Huntington 1957; Ockey, 2007; Punchada and 
Ricks, 2016).  
 As Thaksin’s second term moved forward, though, factions within the military as well 
as the Privy Council were increasingly unhappy with the prime minister’s meddling. With 
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political protests on the streets of Bangkok and the threat of violence, the unassailable 
Thaksin juggernaut weakened. Retired general and former Prime Minister Prem 
Tinsulanonda publicly spoke to military officials, openly arguing that the military owed little 
allegiance to an elected government (Pasuk and Baker, 2009). The 2005 and 2006 military 
reshuffles were both highly contentious (Chambers 2013a). While not the sole cause, the 
increasing subjective control over the military was a strong contributing factor for the 2006 
coup (Ockey 2007).  
 With the coup, the military reasserted its dominance in the political arena, 
demonstrating its independent political authority. In 2008, the Defence Administration Act 
institutionalized military dominance in promotions, removing the capacity of elected officials 
to independently control promotions above the rank of brigadier general. Post-coup 
governments have never been able to re-establish control over the military reshuffles, which 
have been dominated by supporters of the 2006 coup. Instead governments bowed to military 
preferences (Chambers, 2010; 2013b). Military expenditures have also increased, reversing a 
trend in reduced military spending since the 1990s.  
 We see, then, that Thaksin and, to a lesser extent, Chuan could exert influence over 
promotions in the military. In both cases, the power balance had tipped toward civilian rule. 
For Chuan, military leadership was significantly weakened in the aftermath of the 1992 
protests. This allowed civilian politicians to exercise greater control over the armed forces. 
Thaksin also enjoyed greater political power than the military, at least during his initial years 
as prime minister, as the military was dominated by officers who openly proclaimed their 
apolitical status (Wassana, 2001). Thaksin thus faced relatively little resistance as he 
leveraged his electoral victories to dominate bureaucratic appointments, within and without 
the military. This, though, seeded resistance within certain factions of the military, 
contributing to the coup (Ockey, 2007).  
24 
 
 The relationship between civilian leaders and the military can be seen as a power 
struggle. From 1992 through 2006, civilians gained some control over the military apparatus, 
but this did not mean that the military bureaucracy had adopted Weberian characteristics or 
submitted itself to politician control. As one of the retired top brass explained in an interview, 
military officials believe themselves independent of civilian control and politicians should be 
forbidden from involvement in the promotion and appointment process (Retired Air Chief 
Marshal, interview with author, Bangkok, 28 January 2014). Indeed, if politicians interfere in 
military decisions, generals feel justified in overturning the political system.  
 To summarize the discussion of political control over bureaucratic appointments, the 
fundamental assumption that politicians hold a dominant position over bureaucrats has 
limited applicability in the Thai case. Elected politicians, as they accumulated political power 
and influence from 1992 through 2006 were able to exercise increasing control over the 
bureaucracy, which indicates that Thailand was moving toward a situation that fits the 
predictions of agency theory. From the example of the Ministry of Interior, we see that 
politicians had made massive gains as principals of the Thai state. At the same time, though, 
there was bureaucratic resistance spearheaded by the military and finally, in 2006, a coup that 
turned back the clock, demonstrating the weakness of political control over the bureaucracy. 
The Thai military bureaucracy maintains a separate source of political power and influence, 
placing it in competition with elected officials rather than under their control. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence above suggests that elected politicians in Thailand increasingly acted as 
principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006. Higher numbers of veto players resulted 
in reduced legislative productivity, and higher levels of legislative capacity tend to align with 
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greater legislative productivity. We also see that the Ministry of Interior had been brought to 
heel according to politician wishes through political control over bureaucratic promotions.  
These relationships, though, were somewhat attenuated by negative examples, such as 
Thaksin’s second government, wherein we would predict above-average legislative 
productivity but the opposite occurred. Additionally, military officials from Defence Ministry 
have resisted politician control; even overthrowing their political principals in 2006 and 
2014. In essence, the assumption that politicians and bureaucrats are in a hierarchical 
relationship has some explanatory power, but it is also incomplete. There is a more 
complicated relationship in play, one which includes a delicate balancing act wherein civilian 
politicians cannot always trust in their control the bureaucracy. At times they may command, 
but at others they must cajole their bureaucratic counterparts.  
These findings hold a set of implications for the study of politician-bureaucrat 
relationships in Thailand and other developing countries. First, agency theory, although 
holding some tenable predictions, faces major challenges as a tool for researching the 
bureaucracy in developing states. The Thai state, among others in the developing world, is far 
from the Weberian ideal, and as such, the underlying monitoring and oversight functions that 
are central to agency theory do not necessarily hold. In cases where politicians do not have 
clear and coherent mechanisms to exert control over the bureaucracy, theories based on a 
hierarchical politician-bureaucrat relationship may highlight the growing power of civilian 
politicians but fail to capture the nuances of power struggles taking place in the process. 
Instead, we need a more pragmatic approach to describe the role of bureaucrats in the Thai 
polity. Rather than agents of the Thai state, they are also actors in the political sphere 
themselves and have repeatedly inserted themselves in politics to protect their interests.  
Theoretically, then, we should consider an interactive model of the politician-
bureaucrat relationship, one which does not assume that politicians enjoy a hierarchical 
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advantage over bureaucrats (Carpenter and Krause 2015). Power relationships in these 
situations are more fluid, linked to patronage, and have not yet crystalized as in a Weberian 
world. Bureaucrats have additional tools whereby they can shirk or sabotage efforts to exert 
political control over their actions. Recognizing this, we should take the political influence of 
the bureaucracy, especially powerful agencies, into consideration when researching both 
politics and policy decisions. I therefore echo Moe (2006, 25) who called for “more research 
on how public sector bureaucrats … attempt to exercise power in gaining control over the 
political authorities that govern them.”  
In studying the Thai state, rather than merely declaring the return of the bureaucratic 
polity, we need to recognize the methods by which bureaucrats actively pursue political 
goals, both individually and as agencies, even when civilian politicians seem to dominate 
(Ockey 2004; Bidhya 2010). For instance, electoral lists obtained from Thailand’s Election 
Commission for parliamentary elections in 2005, 2007, and 2011 all contained a strong 
showing of both retired and active bureaucrats, with 16.4, 16.8, and 14.3 percent of the 
respective party-list candidates coming from the bureaucracy. Civil servants were also well-
represented in district campaigns, with 12.9, 11.9, and 8.6 percent of district candidates 
hailing from the bureaucracy. Among those elected in 2011, 78 parliamentarians (15.6 
percent of the total) were former bureaucrats. Additionally, former bureaucrats make strong 
showings in political leadership. Theera Wongsamut, a Royal Irrigation Department official, 
has presided over the Chat Thai Pattana party since 2013; Yongyuth Wichaidit, a former 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, headed the Pheu Thai Party from 2008-2012. 
By the end of her administration, over half of Yingluck’s cabinet was composed of former 
bureaucrats. Also, lest we forget, Thaksin Shinawatra began his career as a bureaucrat in the 
police force for 14 years where he laid foundations for his later business and political success 
(Pasuk and Baker 2009, 36-40).  
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Taking a longer view of Thai history (see the attached Appendix Table 1) we see an 
interesting pattern in Thai legislation wherein the bureaucrats that populate legislatures 
during juntas and appointed governments tend to write and adopt many more statutes than 
their civilian counterparts. From 1958 through 2013, juntas produced approximately ten times 
as many laws, while appointed governments were about three times a fruitful. Appointed 
legislatures also compose the most detailed legislation found in the Thai legal canon. 
Bureaucrats have thus authored laws to regulate the behaviour of politicians and reduce the 
amount of discretion they enjoy, turning agency theory upon its head. The new 2017 
Constitution furthers this effort, as conservative military officials and other actors have 
tailored the document to weaken the potential power of civilian politicians. The charter, in its 
present form, enshrines a leading role for bureaucrats in the coming years (Khemthong 2017). 
It remains to be seen, though, whether such institutional engineering will endure when social 
and political pressures that have been held in check by the junta are released. Civilian 
politicians will likely challenge these constraints, and Thai constitutions are notorious for 
their short lifespans.      
In sum, labelling Thai bureaucrats and politicians as agents and principals is 
something of a misnomer. As demonstrated above, Thai politicians have played the part of 
principals, but their command of the bureaucracy is not absolute. Even Thaksin, who enjoyed 
unprecedented sway, was constrained in his efforts to control the Thai state. Thai bureaucrats, 
on the other hand, often act as agents, but some venture into the realm of principals. The 
politician-bureaucrat relationship embodies tension, interaction, cooperation, and transactions 
that leave politicians as something less than absolute principals and bureaucrats as more than 
agents.  
 
 
28 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Previous incarnations of this paper were circulated under the title “Agents as Principals: 
Bureaucracy and Policy Control in Thailand,” which received valuable feedback from many 
people, including Nithi Nuangjamnong, Thorn Pitidol, Orapin Sopchokchai, Eric Hyer, Allen 
Hicken, Joel Selway, Danny Marks, and attendees of talks at Thammasat University, 
Naresuan University, and Brigham Young University. Thanks also go to Piyaporn Srichirat 
for research assistance on Thai laws. Comments from anonymous reviewers and the editor 
significantly enhanced the final article. I bear responsibility for any mistakes.  
 
1 I chose not to address monitoring institutions, bureaucratic reorganizations, and budgetary control, as these 
mechanisms are relatively weak in Thailand. After the 1997 Constitution, a variety of monitoring mechanisms 
like an ombudsman office and constitutional and administrative courts were established, but these were quickly 
dominated by government officials, leaving “decisions about administrative reforms … very much in the hands 
of permanent bureaucrats” (Bidhya 2000, 403; see also Ginsburg 2009; Dressel 2010; Merieau 2016). 
Bureaucratic reorganizations are notoriously rare in Thailand, with the big bang restructuring in October 2002 
being the “first major reorganization of ministries since King Chulalongkorn set up Thailand’s modern system 
of departmental government in 1897” (Painter 2006, 39). Budget management is still based on the 1959 
Budgetary Method Royal Act written during the dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and reforms that 
occurred under Thaksin were limited by the 2006 coup (Akira 2014).  
2 There is some concern that the post-2006 governments may behave differently due to the threat of military 
intervention in politics (Chambers 2013b). This is especially true of the Abhisit government (2009-2011), as it 
was formed after two judicial coups and with military backing. While its origins were far from democratic, the 
legislature remained an elected body, and the government performed in a manner more consistent with elected 
governments than appointed ones. Even so, I repeat my statistical analyses below with a constrained dataset that 
excluded post-2006 governments.  
3 Royal Acts and Emergency Decrees both carry the weight of law. Royal Acts are adopted through the normal 
legislative process. Emergency Decrees have the same force as an Act, but are promulgated without prior 
legislative approval; shortly thereafter, though, they must be presented to parliament. If legislative approval is 
not granted, the decree becomes invalid. I did not include subordinate legislation in my counts, as these actions 
do not, in effect, change the law. Subordinate legislation includes ministerial regulations, royal decrees 
(Praracha Kritsadika), rules, notifications, and orders, all of which must not contravene standing law. They are 
also enacted without input from the full parliament, in contrast to Royal Acts and Emergency Decrees. 
Furthermore, they are not included in the Yearly Summary of the Laws produced by the Secretariat of the House 
of Representatives.   
In my counts, annual budgets are excluded, as they are passed every year regardless of the government. While 
the subject of internal horse-trading, they follow a standard format, and their passage would not vary based on 
explanations here. Expropriation bills are also excluded, as they are adopted, often in large numbers, as part of 
infrastructure projects. Thus, a decision to build a highway would greatly inflate the number of laws passed but 
tell us little about the capacity of that government to actually legislate. 
4 From 1993-2012 the US Congress, which faces more institutional checks than Thai parliament, passed 
approximately 18 laws per month (see Brookings 2017). Parliament in the United Kingdom enacted 
approximately 222 laws per month under Tony Blair (1997-2007) and 200 laws per month under John Major 
(1990-1997) (Sweet & Maxwell 2007). Singapore and Malaysia, one-party regimes with tight links between 
government and the bureaucracy, both passed approximately 2.9 laws per month from 2007-2015; Indonesia, 
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with extensive checks in the legislative process, produced 2.7 laws per month between 2000 and 2012 (author 
counts from the respective parliamentary websites).  
5 Prior to 2001, Thai parties themselves were frequently subject to factional infighting as demonstrated in 
Chambers (2008). From 2001-2006, though factions were essentially stymied. Their strength increased again 
after the 2007 constitution (Chambers and Croissant 2010), but their threat to government stability was 
weakened (Hicken and Selway 2012). For simplicity across the changing political landscape, I focus on parties. 
Running the analysis below on a constrained dataset from 1992-2001 using Chambers’ (2008) faction 
calculations as a substitute for parties results in similar outcomes for laws per month but null results on both 
pages and articles per law, likely due to the reduced number of observations in the sample.  
6 It is important to remember that Thai political parties generally lack any particular ideology, and as such, they 
have historically not campaigned on policy platforms. Public policy under any administration tends to be devoid 
of ideological focus. The Thai Rak Thai party and its successors, though, have begun offering policy promises 
to voters (see Hicken and Selway 2012).  
7 Ramkhamhaeng University has been suspected of providing easy coursework for Thai politicians seeking 
degrees (Pennington 1999).  
8 Yingluck’s government was potentially subject to military oversight, which may have reduced her legislative 
productivity despite her electoral dominance (Chambers 2013b).  
9 McCargo (2005) has argued that the growth of civilian control during this period was partly due to the actions 
of the palace via the privy council’s General Prem Tinsulanonda. In this perspective, the “network monarchy” 
operates as a potential alternative principal for the military. This essay, though, focuses only on the politician-
bureaucrat relationship. For more consideration on the interaction between bureaucracy and the palace see 
Chambers and Napisa (2016) and Merieau (2016).    
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Table 1: Variation in Legislative Productivity across Governments 
 
 
Laws Per 
Month* 
Pages Per 
Law* 
Articles Per 
Law* 
Effective 
Number of 
Coalition 
Parties** 
Legislative 
Capacity of 
Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai I 
     Nov 1992 - July 1995 
2.28 4.77 14.97 3.69  High 
Banharn Silapa-Archa 
    July 1995 – Nov 1996 
2.09 5.50 17.44 3.98 Low 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
    Nov 1996 – Nov 1997 
2.87 6.82 22.79 2.56 Low 
Chuan Leekpai II 
    Nov 1997 – Feb 2001 
5.41 8.18 26.16 2.72 High 
Thaksin Shinawatra I 
    Feb 2001 – Mar 2005 
2.96 9.54 28.20 1.43 High 
Thaksin Shinawatra II 
    Mar 2005 – Sept 2006 
1.50 5.45 15.28 1 High 
Samak Sundaravej 
    Jan 2008 – Sept 2008 
0 0 0 1.76 Moderate 
Somchai Wongsawat 
    Sept 2008 – Dec 2008 
0.4 2 6 1.76 High 
Abhisit Vejjajjiva 
    Dec 2008 – Aug 2011 
2.30 8.84 24.96 2.33 High 
Yingluck Shinawatra 
    Aug 2011 – Dec 2013 
1.74 5.80 18.54 1.27 Moderate 
*Counts include Acts (Phraracha Banyat), Emergency Decrees (Phraracha Kamnod), Organic Laws, and Constitutional Amendments 
drawn from the Yearly Summary of the Laws (multiple years), produced by the Secretariat of the House of Representatives.  
** Calculated monthly average from government’s tenure, including cabinet reshuffles. 
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Table 2: Effect of Coalition Size and Legislative Capacity on  
Monthly Legislative Productivity 
 
 
 
Laws Per Month Pages Per Law Articles Per Law 
 1992-
2013 
1992-
2006 
1992-
2013 
1992-
2006 
1992-
2013 
1992-
2006 
 
Effective Number of 
Coalition Parties 
 
-0.007 
(0.252) 
-0.162 
(0.340) 
-1.041* 
(0.597) 
-1.291* 
(0.749) 
-4.075** 
(1.617) 
-4.924** 
(1.988) 
 
Legislative Capacity 
of Prime Minister 
 
0.632* 
(0.352) 
0.475 
(0.475) 
0.931* 
(0.563) 
0.546 
(0.583) 
1.252 
(1.962) 
0.104 
(2.084) 
 
Mass Protests 
 
-1.369** 
(0.437) 
-1.749** 
(0.837) 
-2.401* 
(1.370) 
-2.262 
(2.978) 
-7.848* 
(4.177) 
-10.687 
(7.499) 
 
Economic Crisis 
 
3.040** 
(0.973) 
2.890** 
(0.994) 
1.907* 
(1.067) 
1.932* 
(1.105) 
8.091** 
(3.570) 
8.038** 
(3.640) 
 
Constant 
 
0.786 
(1.178) 
1.772 
(1.824) 
6.829** 
(2.360) 
8.516** 
(3.061) 
25.773** 
(7.377) 
31.208** 
(9.470) 
       
Observations 239 168 145 107 145 107 
Adjusted R square 0.103 0.090 0.049 0.056 0.056 0.699 
       
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p < 0.1 
** p < 0.05 
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Appendix Table 1: Legislative Productivity across Thai Governments 
1953-2013 
 
Government Type of 
Legislature 
Days in 
office 
Laws 
per 
month 
Pages 
per law 
Articles 
per law 
Sarit Thanarat I Junta 4 15.2  2 
Pote Sarasin Appointed 96 11.4  9.9 
Thanom Kitikajorn I Elected 292 2  2.6 
Sarit Thanarat II Junta 111 9.6  3.3 
Sarit Thanarat III Appointed 1763 8.3  17.1 
Thanom Kitikajorn II Appointed 1914 3.2  39.7 
Thanom Kitikajorn III Elected 984 1.3  27.6 
Thanom Kitikajorn IV Junta 395 23.1  8.7 
Thanom Kitikajorn V Appointed 301 1.9  11.7 
Sanya Tammasak Appointed 475 8.5  31.3 
Seni Pramoj II Elected 26 1.2  0 
Kukrit Pramoj Elected 398 0.5  11 
Seni Pramoj III-IV Elected 169 1.3  16.5 
Sangad Chaloryu I Junta 2 0  0 
Tanin Kraivixien Appointed 377 4.4  13.5 
Sangad Chaloryu II Junta 22 29  4.4 
Kriangsak Chumanan I Appointed 546 8.6  45.2 
Kriangsak Chumanan II Elected 295 2.5  18.5 
Prem Tinasulanond I-III Elected 2979 2.7  30.4 
Chatichai Choonhavan I-II Elected 933 2.3  23.6 
Sundara Kongsompong Junta 11 83  2.7 
Anand Panyarachun I Appointed 412 11.9  52.4 
Suchinda Kraprayoon Elected 64 0.7 2 4 
Anand Panyarachun II Elected 105 1.5 3.2 6.6 
Chuan Leekpai I Elected 1023 2.3 4.8 15 
Banharn Silapa-Archa Elected 501 2.1 5.5 17.4 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh Elected 349 2.9 6.8 22.8 
Chuan Leekpai II Elected 1196 5.4 8.2 26.2 
Thaksin Shinawatra I Elected 1490 3 9.5 28.2 
Thaksin Shinawatra II Elected 559 1.5 5.4 15.3 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin Junta 12 97.4 2 3.9 
Surayud Chulanont Appointed 486 10.9 10.9 29.4 
Samak Sundaravej Elected 215 0 0 0 
Somchai Wongsawat Elected 69 0.4 2 6 
Abhisit Vejjajjiva Elected 962 2.3 8.8 25 
Yingluck Shinawatra* Elected 876 1.7 5.8 18.5 
*Count ends on 31 December 2013.  
Notes: Numbers for Sarit Thanarat through Anand Panyarachun I are from Chistensen and Siamwalla 1993, 
Appendix 1. Numbers from Suchinda Kraprayoon through Yingluck Shinawatra are author calculations. Days 
in office are based on dates from the Secretariat of the Cabinet. Law counts include Acts (Phraracha 
Banyat), Emergency Decrees (Phraracha Kamnod), Organic Laws, and Constitutional Amendments drawn 
from Yearly Summary of the Laws (multiple years), produced by the Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives. See endnote 3 in the text for further clarification.  
 
 
